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Abstract 
Jihadism has become a major topic in Western as well as non-western public debate. Many military 
groups have sprung up in late 20th and early 21st century, claiming legitimacy using jihad for a 
wide variety of causes ranging from Kashmir, Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, 
Yemen and Nigeria. This leads to the question whether Islamist fundamentalism has been 
successful in projecting jihad to mean engagement in a violent ‘holy war’ against the dominant 
West, which can then be extended against non-Muslims elsewhere. It has assumed the importance 
of a major factor of contemporary societal, political and military security and insecurity. This thesis 
attempts to make a small contribution to better understanding some of these aspects of violent 
jihadism.  
Since the 1979-1989 war in Afghanistan, terrorist groups continue to use jihad as legitimate 
justification for all the activities they carry out. The past three decades have witnessed several 
revivals and reproductions in the global jihadi movement under different names and under various 
leaders. But they all revolve around the idea of formation of the Caliphate – the ideal state. Even 
though jihad provided the catalyst for the core doctrine of all these groups and organizations, it is 
one of many other. These organizations came up in the wake of failed states that had undergone 
armed conflicts and wars, political violence, human rights violations and military coups. The 
organizations wasted no time in exploiting situations where there was a security, political or 
military vacuum and rushed in to lay the groundwork in those areas as a first step that would 
guarantee its subsequent growth so that it may execute its agendas. Hotbeds of conflict seen in the 
Islamic world today serve as testament of the success of this tactic. Let us look at the disastrous 
situation in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Afghanistan and other countries, in which these 
groups operate sowing death and destruction, and leading to displacement of populations. 
 
My focus in this thesis is on analysing the circumstances that support the growth of terrorist groups, 
and which enable them to continue in a perpetual state of renewal very similar to the rebranding of 
corporate brands, by trying to answer the following question: Why do terrorist groups continue to 
grow anew while they are in a state of permanent renewal? 
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I. Introduction 
Jihadism has become a major topic in Western as well as non-western public debate. Many 
military groups have sprung up in late 20th and early 21st century, claiming legitimacy using jihad 
for a wide variety of causes ranging from Kashmir, Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Syria, Yemen and Nigeria. This leads to the current debate on the subject whether Islamist 
fundamentalism has been successful in projecting jihad to mean engagement in a violent ‘holy war’ 
against the dominant West, which can then be extended against non-Muslims elsewhere. It has 
assumed the importance of a major factor of contemporary societal, political and military security 
and insecurity. 
This debate is happening in the backdrop of strategic thinking about security that had moved out 
of the military sphere in the mid 90s post-Cold War international scenario.  The fissure in security 
studies theory based on the dominant state-centric approach on the one hand and that which sought 
to unravel the various societal components was sought to be remedied and bridged. The new 
framework encompasses issues and referent objects in the economic, environmental and societal 
sectors, as well as the strategic studies that concern the military-political angle. The new unified 
theory better explains how issues become securitized, and to locate the relevant security dynamics 
on levels ranging from local, through regional to global. With the end of the bipolar system in the 
new Millennium, international ties have taken on a more regionalized approach (Buzan, Weaver, 
and de Wilde 1998). 
 
Given the relatively little time that researchers had to comprehend the current rise of violent 
Islamism not all analysis has been up to scratch with understanding the genealogy as well as current 
dynamics of the phenomenon. This thesis attempts to make a small contribution to better 
understanding some of these aspects of violent jihadism.  
 
 A lot is being said about the underlying factors that have led to its emergence and relatively 
rapid  spread  in the Middle East.  Although Islamic State has laid claim to the establishment of a 
caliphate in late June last year, stretching across territory it held in Iraq and Syria, its origins date 
back to late 90s in Jordan and Afghanistan. While mutating across time and territory, it has proved 
to be a much greater menace to that rest of the world in its aim and approach than Al Qaeda. This is 
so because of its military and fighting capabilities, ability to attract fighters from across the globe 
and its considerable financial resources. While maintaining control over vast terrain and regions 
across Iraq and Syria, it has opened up a major confrontation on sectarian scale in the Middle East, 
and at the same time issued an open call to wage jihad or holy war by Muslims in the West. 
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From a Western viewpoint, the main dangers stem from the condition of general instability 
within the Middle East in which jihadi groups have flourished from Iraq, Syria and Yemen. 
According to Charles Lister,  although the coalition of western and Arab forces have targeted 
Islamic State leadership and units by aerial bombardment, the best way to counter terrorism in the 
region would be to address the sectarian and socio-political conditions in Iraq and Syria that led to 
dangerous fissures (Lister 2014). 
 
The savagery displayed by jihadist groups today has become a source of concern for the entire 
world, foremost being the Arab and Muslim world which is itself being accused of exporting evil 
and terror. Despite the fact that Europe and the Western world is considered infidel territory by the 
jihadi groups, it is the Arab and Muslim world which has had to pay a much higher price in terms of 
human lives and physical destruction in its capitals and cities at the hands of this savagery. It is not 
hard to fathom why. The political regimes that control Islamic countries are considered in the view 
of these groups to be apostate regimes which are products of the post-colonial period -- alternative 
projects created by the ‘infidel West’ to replace the Dream State of the Islamic Caliphate. 
 
The war in Afghanistan to expel the Soviet forces marked a fundamental turning point in the 
globalization of jihadi activities. The doctrine of jihad gained momentum during that crucial 
decade, and I can say that during this period there was not a home in the Arab and Muslim world 
that did not have cassettes and brochures distributed by the followers of Abdullah Azzam that told 
the wonderful and miraculous stories of the Mujahedeen in their fight against the Soviet invasion. 
This was followed by a new growth in the tide of jihad that then reached Chechnya and Bosnia and 
the wave that accompanied Jihadi activities was renewed. The Chechen-Russian conflict dates back 
centuries ago. But the most recent conflict was in the 90s after the breakup of the Soviet Union gave 
the Chechen separatists the opportunity to declare independence in 1991. After two years of 
fighting from late 1994, the Russian forces withdrew. In 1999, the fighting resumed and ended next 
year, with Moscow establishing direct control over Chechnya. The nationalistic struggle meanwhile 
has taken on terrorist and religious colour. Radical Islamists from Chechnya and other North 
Caucasian republics have set off many terror attacks in Russia. 
   International commentators have been late in finding links between the Balkan conflict in 
Bosnia and Herzegovnia during 1992-95 and Al Qaeda’s export of terror to the West. Foreign 
mujahideen from post-Soviet Afghanistan to Lebanese Shia Hezbollah joined the conflict on behalf 
of the Bosnian Muslim population and its forces, under attack from both Serb as well as Croat 
forces. Additionally, the UN arms embargo was a major disadvantage for the Bosnian attempt to 
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defend itself. Iran came in with aid to the besieged Bosniak forces through supply of weapons and 
advisers. But eventually, under the terms of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the bulk of the foreign 
mujahideen had to move out. It has been noted that the Bosnian conflict gave the Arab fighters from 
post-Soviet  Afghanistan a war theatre to test their skills in European conditions and also were able 
to motivate a new generation of pan-Islamic militia groups. From there it is easy to extrapolate the 
links to the current radicalization of youth in Europe (Kohlmann 2002). 
 
 Then there were al-Qaeda’s activities in Iraq, which led to a sectarian and bloody war, the 
sources of which have not dried up until now, with jihadi activity being actively stoked by what is 
known as the ‘Islamic state’. This is a new step in the path of the renewal of jihad across the world -
- that of removing borders. The Islamic State joined the cities of Mosul in Iraq and Deir al-Zour in 
Syria to form the nucleus of a national state with an Islamic flavour aimed at reviving the Islamic 
Caliphate. Individuals who do not owe allegiance, loyalty and obedience to the new Khalifa Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi, were to be considered apostates who must be killed wherever they are to be 
found. 
 
Every since the 1979-1989 war in Afghanistan, terrorist groups continue to use jihad as 
legitimate justification for all the activities they carry out. The past three decades have witnessed 
several revivals and reproductions in the global jihadi movement under different names and under 
various leaders. But they all revolve around the idea of formation of the Caliphate – the ideal state. 
Even though jihad provided the catalyst for the core doctrine of all these groups and organizations, 
it is one of many other. Another significant provided them with a fertile environment for growth. 
These organizations came up in the wake of failed states that had undergone armed conflicts and 
wars, political violence, human rights violations and military coups. The organizations wasted no 
time in exploiting situations where there was a security, political or military vacuum and rushed in 
to lay the groundwork in those areas as a first step that would guarantee its subsequent growth so 
that it may execute its agendas. Hotbeds of conflict seen in the Islamic world today serve as 
testament of the success of this tactic. Let us look at the disastrous situation in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, 
Libya, Somalia, Afghanistan and other countries, in which these groups operate sowing death and 
destruction, and leading to displacement of populations. 
 
My focus in this thesis is on analysing the circumstances that support the growth of terrorist 
groups, and which enable them to continue in a perpetual state of renewal very similar to the 
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rebranding of corporate brands, by trying to answer the following question: Why do terrorist 
groups continue to grow anew while they are in a state of permanent renewal? 
 
Through studying the historical background of the evolution of the concept of jihad and the 
diversity of jihadist movements and the circumstances in which they were born, I arrived at a 
hypothesis that will be tested in this thesis in order to answer the question posed above. This 
hypothesis can be articulated as follows:  The fragility of states in the Middle East and the lack 
of full integration by Muslim immigrants into Western society are largely responsible for the 
success of violent jihadi projects. 
 
I would like to clarify the point that this thesis does not deny the point of view which says 
that religion is an important and central factor in stimulating these groups to exercise their Jihadi 
activities. This school of thought, which seeks an explanation of why terrorist groups continue to 
grow, based on religious text and the Jihadi doctrine is true and no one can deny this rationale. But 
what I'm trying to do through this thesis is to focus on the role of areas of conflict and fragile states 
in providing the appropriate environment for the growth of such groups. 
 
The point which I shall rely on to support my point of view is that the doctrine of violent 
jihad has existed for decades. If we take the example of the jihadist thought of Hassan al-Banna in 
the  concept of the emergence of the Islamic state and its liberation from colonialism and the 
creation of a military force aimed at reviving jihad, we find that they are ideas that strayed one way 
or the other due to lack of implementation. At one point, the Muslim Brotherhood did attempt to 
form a special forces group, but conditions were not conducive to turning these ideas into 
operations on the ground. This doctrine remained as a mere idea until the appropriate climate was 
found. By the appropriate climate I mean areas of conflict, war, sectarian and ethnic violence, and 
situations where states are occupied, especially those with the status of countries in the Muslim 
world such as Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq. This leads us to think in terms of the need to work on 
minimising these scenarios as a first step in preventing these jihadi groups from accessing areas of 
conflict.  A second step would be to work to find effective solutions to these conflicts and disputes 
through political and peaceful means based on reconciliation, consultation and mutual 
understanding. The current scenario calls for a radical solution to mitigate conflict zones and a 
drying up of the sources nurturing these groups. 
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During my thesis and preparation process in writing this paper, I was firmly convinced about the 
role of Muslim communities in terms of moving forward towards political and social integration as 
a parallel project to counter the phenomenon of the violent jihadist tide towards Europe. But the 
urgent need to answer an important question before delving into the characteristics of such a project 
presented itself. Do these communities really believe in the concept of integration as a methodology 
that can be relied upon to neutralise the religious legitimacy claimed by Islamist groups? Do they 
really seek to integrate? But I discovered an even more important step in advancing this particular 
project amidst Muslim communities. Is it possible for these communities to first recognize that the 
religious justification derived from the interpretations of scholars and preachers is an important 
factor in legitimizing the work of these Islamist groups, and that we, therefore, urgently need a 
comprehensive review of all of this content that has been disseminated over centuries based on self-
criticism and distancing ourselves from the reverence these scholars seem to command? From here 
we can begin, by first answering this question. I foresee that the answer will be very difficult and 
will need many detailed case studies and in-depth research on the viability of Muslim societies in 
Europe and the Muslim world to engage in self-criticism in order to rid itself of the state of divinity 
in which they are trapped, and which prevents them from using reason and logic without being 
dragged towards a state of religious mania whipped up by scholars who see themselves as the light 
of God on earth and who are worthy of blind obedience in their interpretations. It suffices at this 
stage in my thesis to try to extend an open call as an experimental step in this project that calls for 
the Muslim communities in general, both in the Islamic world and in Europe, to look at themselves 
and to admit with courage that it bears responsibility in one way or another for a large part of that 
legitimacy claimed by those Islamist groups. It is the ignorance of these communities in matters of 
religious thought and its obsession with the world of Fatwa as enshrined by some sheikhs, preachers 
and jurists that prevent individual Muslims to think for themselves. The jihadi groups count on this 
to perpetuate their grip over the community. 
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II. Disposition:  
In this thesis paper, I have tried to offer an analysis and evaluation of the 
circumstances that support the growth of terrorist groups by studying the historical 
background of the evolution of the concept of jihad and the diversity of jihadist movements. 
Here are brief overviews of my thesis as seen from the perspective of each section of this 
paper. 
  
In the Historical Background section, I have examined the doctrine of jihad from the 
view point of ideas revived in the early twentieth century by Hasan al-Banna, the founder of 
the Muslim Brotherhood movement, and how this doctrine assumed the form of organised 
operations in military style. In the paper, I have highlighted the key role of Services Office 
in inspiring fighters heading to Afghanistan and in expanding the scope of their operations 
to include Islamic jihad to other parts of the world. In this section, I have presented the main 
points of the doctrine of ‘jihad’ and the link between the doctrine of jihad and the Muslim 
Brotherhood as well as the emergence of the “Islamic State” as a formidable force. 
 
 
In a series of literature review, I have looked at the role played by fragile or failed 
states in formulating the brand of transnational terror unleashed by Osama Bin Laden. I have 
also brought to fore the issues of integration of Muslim immigrants in Europe, and how they 
are pitted against the values and the prejudices of the host societies. The debate about 
Islam’s compatibility with Western values, and the claim of an ideological war between 
Islam and the West are interesting aspect of literary observations. Through the reviews, I 
have examined whether there are any prospects of a reconciliation of Islam and the West 
and what implications, if at all, are there for possible Muslim integration. 
 
In the Theoretical framework highlighted the role of fragile states in the scheme of 
things, I have presented through this paper the emergence of the main dilemmas that are of 
significant consequence in the integration of immigrant communities in Europe and of 
Muslim communities in particular. My effort has been to point to the fact that the 
communities in the fragile states have tried to escape harsh reality of their countries to 
search for countries that can guarantee them a decent living, security and peace. In this 
thesis paper, I have explained how the waves of migration have contributed to making the 
fragile states more fragile and prone to a situation of complete collapse. 
Page 10 of 53 
 
 
In methodology, I have utilised the Fragile States Index, an annual ranking of 178 
states based on their levels of stability and the amount of pressure they face, to study the 
patterns of trans-border terrorism and the spread of Islamic jihad in recent years. This thesis 
paper has also made use of the Global Terrorism Index of 2014 as a means of pin-pointing 
the core issues related to jihadist movements. I have also attempted in this thesis to present 
opinion pieces, thesis and studies which revolve around the subject, by referring to global 
events related to terrorism, as well as the Hijab debate in France, the prohibition of minarets 
in Switzerland, and the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris. 
 
In key findings of this thesis paper, I have identified that there is a strategy according 
to which violent jihadi groups reinvent themselves and thereby renew the call for the 
emergence of an Islamic state. I have also expressed the view that it is the grim reality that 
these groups have reached a point of no return, as reflected in the emergence of a “real state” 
carrying the name of the ‘Islamic Caliphate’ in the border region between Iraq and Syria. 
 
In this thesis paper, I have identified the reasons driving many Muslim and non-
Muslim communities to migrate to developed countries. I have pointed out that the issue of 
the integration of immigrants in the European community is paramount due to the wide gaps 
between the religions, cultural beliefs and societal behaviours. I have also pointed out in this 
thesis paper the opportunity offered by History towards mutual recognition of Muslim and 
Western societies. In this endeavour, it has been my effort to highlight the mistakes made by 
some members of European communities in taking a generalized view of the situation and 
holding all members of Muslim communities primarily responsible for the death and 
violence by some terrorist groups. 
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III. Historical Background 
Catalyst Element: The ‘Jihad’ 
Since the arrival of fighters in Afghanistan in 1980 to participate in the war against the 
Soviet Union or “the Holy War” as it was known, the doctrine of ‘jihad’ began to acquire 
systematic features. Consequently, from being just a set of ideas revived in the early twentieth 
century by Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, this doctrine 
assumed the form of organised operations, carried out in perfect military style. 
 
Such groups regarded ‘jihad’ as a deep religious concept that could be used to defeat the 
Great Powers. The ouster of the Soviets from Afghanistan and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
were seen by some as actual proof of the effectiveness of this jihadist approach in the “liberation of 
peoples”. This was good enough reason to convince all the fighters arriving in Afghanistan from 
several regions of the Islamic world, and especially from the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East, to 
embrace this principle. More importantly, in Afghanistan, these were the first signs of a surge of 
fighters who believed in ‘jihad’ as a transnational approach. This trend was represented by the 
organization of al-Qaeda, which was founded by Osama Bin Laden, a young man from Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
What is known as Services Office (Maktab Al Khidmat MAK)
 
 played an important role in 
feeding the fighters heading to Afghanistan to fight there, since it worked as a sort of guesthouse for 
the fighters who were subsequently called “the Afghan Arabs”. This office worked in the Pakistani 
city of Peshawar, bordering Afghanistan, as a military camp to recruit soldiers for the Afghan war 
front. This office, which was founded by the spiritual father of the fighters in Afghanistan, Abdullah 
Azzam, worked for the establishment of a network of recruitment offices all over the world, 
including the United States.(Roth, Greenburg, and Wille, n.d.) 
 
Although many leaders of these groups agreed that ‘jihad’ as a doctrine represented the only 
way to rescue the community, the nature of this relationship was threatened by tension between the 
pioneers of this systematic set of ideas. With the end of the Soviet military mission in Afghanistan, 
some jihadists expanded the scope of their operations to include the extension of the Islamic jihad to 
other parts of the world, such as Israel and Kashmir. To achieve these ambitions several 
overlapping and interrelated organizations were formed, including al-Qaeda, which was formed by 
Osama Bin Laden in the initial meeting that was held on 11 August 1988. Bin Laden wished to 
carry out non-military operations in other regions of the world. On the contrary, Abdullah Azzam 
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wanted to continue focusing on military campaigns. After the assassination of Azzam in 1989, the 
Services Office was closed and many joined Bin Laden’s organization. 
The differences between Abdullah Azzam and Osama Bin Laden were clear indications of the sharp 
and irreversible differences between these two poles. This separation was one cause, among others, 
of the crucial rift that would have affected the militant groups in Afghanistan. 
 
Abdullah Azzam adopted a concept of ‘jihad’ based on its fundamentalist and traditional 
interpretation, calling for the restoration of lands that were once under Muslim rule such as 
Palestine or areas under Soviet rule, and even southern Spain, which was under Islamic rule five 
centuries ago. In sharp contrast to this approach, Bin Laden believed it was necessary to overthrow 
all the governments in the Islamic world that he dubbed as “Apostate Governments”. This concept 
was, however, rejected by Azzam and his followers because they thought that this could cause strife 
among Muslims. 
 
Main points of the doctrine of ‘jihad’: 
‘Jihad’ worked as a catalyst to attract Muslim youth to join these groups, which aimed to 
promote and revitalize themselves with an emphasis on the importance of the liberation of the 
Islamic community. During the twentieth century these Islamic groups played an important role in 
the formation of the jihadist extremist ideology, and these personalities played a vital role in the 
promotion of the concept of the ‘jihad’ as a systematic operation, starting from the revival and the 
promotion of this trend by the leader and the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, Hasan 
al-Banna, eventually culminating in fatwas issued by Abdullah Azzam to fight against the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan. 
 
Abdullah Azzam: known as the spiritual father of this modern trend of global ‘jihad’,  
acquired his education in Islamic law and philosophy in the universities of Amman and Damascus 
and in the Egyptian University of Al-Azhar, one of the oldest universities in the world and the most 
famous in the Islamic world. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Azzam was one of the 
first Arabs to reach Pakistan to help the jihadists. Azzam issued a fatwa calling for ‘jihad’ against 
the Soviets, declaring that it was the individual duty of every Muslim who could afford it because it 
was a defensive ‘jihad’ against the invaders.(Bruce Riedel 2011) 
 
Azzam travelled all over the world, including America, urging Muslims to join “the caravan 
of jihad” in Afghanistan. He developed the idea that Muslims had to engage truthfully in a global 
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‘jihad’ against their enemies, especially Russia and then America. Azzam wrote dozens of articles 
and books to glorify the need for a global battle against the enemies of Islam. His works also glorify 
the suicide bombings and martyrdoms, and the basic elements of the tactics of al-Qaeda. These 
included a list of the disciples of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of the organization of al-
Qaeda in Iraq (Bruce Riedel 2011) . They specifically had a significant role in the establishment of 
a second generation of jihadist currents. In the subsequent sections, the effects of these two figures 
in the growth of the extremist jihadist groups will be reviewed. 
 
Abdullah Azzam had a very charismatic personality that attracted many admirers around the 
Arab and Muslim world, and his books gained much popularity among the enthusiastic young 
Muslims engaged in ‘jihad’. Abdullah Azzam laid the foundations of the al-Qaeda movement and 
the war in Afghanistan, and served as a spiritual mentor of Osama Bin Laden. In late November and 
early December 1989, al-Qaeda was founded on the basis of the idea (“Solid base”) developed by 
Azzam and mentioned for the first time in an article he wrote and published in the monthly “al-
Jihad” (April 1988). Later, Osama Bin Laden declared in Peshawar that this organization (Maliach, 
n.d.) was founded and that Azzam, the ideological founder of the organization of al-Qaeda, was 
assassinated in a car bombing whose blast was detonated by a remote control in Peshawar. It is not 
certain who killed him (Aryn Baker 2009). 
 
Osama Bin Laden: Azzam met Bin Laden in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in 1980, 
when Azzam was studying in a Saudi university, where their relationship started (Bruce Riedel 
2011). Bin Laden travelled to Afghanistan in 1984, in response to the calls for ‘jihad’ issued by his 
spiritual mentor Abdullah Azzam, to participate in the Islamic holy war against the Soviet 
occupation forces. Bin Laden came from a Saudi family that had large fortunes and financed the 
war in Afghanistan and provided leadership for more than 20,000 fighters recruited from all over 
the world (Telegraph 2012). Bin Laden developed his political belief during study at King 
Abdulaziz University in late 1970, and became a follower of Abdullah Azzam, the spiritual leader 
that believed that it was an obligation for all Muslims to engage in ‘jihad’ to found a single Islamic 
State. This idea had significant impact on young Muslims like Bin Laden, who was always critical 
of what he saw as the growing Western influence on life in the Middle East. With the invasion of 
Afghanistan by Soviet forces, Azzam and Bin Laden travelled to Peshawar in Pakistan to join the 
battle. They did not become fighters by themselves, but they employed their prayers and their 
extensive contacts in the Middle East to gain financial and moral support for the jihadists. They also 
encouraged young people to migrate from all over the Middle East region to take part in the Afghan 
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Jihad, and together they founded the organization’s Services Office which served as the 
headquarters of the global jihadists(Staff 2009). 
 
Ayman al-Zawahiri: Al-Zawahiri was engaged in the activities of political Islam movements 
since an early age when he was still in school, and the foundations of his radical ideas were formed 
by his admiration for al-Sayyid Qutb. He was arrested at the age of fifteen for having joined the 
banned Muslim Brotherhood. The political activities of al-Zawahiri did not prevent him from 
studying medicine at Cairo University, from which he graduated in 1974 and earned a Master’s 
Degree in Surgery after four years. Later, he founded a medical clinic in a suburb of Cairo but he 
soon started to gravitate toward radical Islamic groups that were calling for the overthrow of the 
Egyptian government.  He joined the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group since its foundation in 1973. In 
1981 he was arrested for being one of the suspects who assassinated the Egyptian President Anwar 
al-Sadat. Despite his acquittal in the case of the assassination of Sadat, he was convicted for the 
possession of illegal weapons and was sentenced to a term of three years. Following his release in 
1985, he left for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Shortly thereafter, he went to Peshawar in Pakistan 
and, at a later date, to neighbouring Afghanistan, where he established a faction of the Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad Movement (Jayshree Bajoria 2011). 
 
The cooperation between al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden began in 1980 in the city of Peshawar, 
where al-Zawahiri was working for the Red Crescent Association (Jayshree Bajoria 2011). In 1998 
al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden announced the formation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against 
Jews and Crusaders. Al-Zawahiri officially merged his movement, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, with 
the network of al-Qaeda of Bin Laden. Al-Zawahiri was accused, along with Osama Bin Laden, by 
the United States of the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. He was 
sentenced to death in absentia, by the Egyptian Court, for an alleged plot to blow up the US 
embassy in Albania(“Ayman Al-Zawahiri Fast Facts - CNN.com” 2015). With Bin Laden getting 
killed by US forces in Pakistan in early May 2011, al-Qaeda announced that it would continue to 
fight the “holy war” against the United States and Israel under the directions of the new leader al-
Zawahiri “until all invading armies would leave the land of Islam” (BBC Report 2014). 
 
The doctrine of Jihad for the Muslim Brotherhood: 
In 1936, Sheikh Hassan al-Banna sent a letter to King Farouk and to Mustafa al-Nahhas, the 
Egyptian Prime Minister, inviting them to take the path of Islam, its foundations, its rules and its 
civilization, and to stay away from the West, its way of life, its systems and curricula. According to 
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the view of Sheikh Hasan al-Banna, this letter was a plan to “save the general situation of Egypt and 
the rest of the Islamic world” as part of efforts to consecrate the principle of rule according to Islam. 
 
The action plan submitted by the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood can be divided into 
three levels. The first level included political, judicial and administrative aspects, since this level 
contained 10 goals to achieve reform. In this regard, Sheikh Hasan al-Banna saw the need to cancel 
all political parties and to redirect all efforts to form a united front that would help to achieve the 
Renaissance of Egypt, strengthen the armed forces, increase the number of young people and 
inspire their enthusiasm, spreading among them the foundations of the Islamic Jihad. Second level 
includes aspects of social life and daily practices, that were identified as 30 steps to help improving 
the overall social status and progress of society, an example of this: people should respect public 
morals: this ought to be the object of special attention; to strongly condemns attacks on public 
mores and morality. In addition to censor theatre production and films; to be severe in approving 
films and combat foreign customs (in the realm of vocabulary, customs , dress, nursing) and to 
Egyptianize all of these (on finds these customs among the will-to-do members of society); Third 
level includes the economic and development side by subtracting 10 goals contribute to the 
improving of the economic situation of the country. (Mitchell 1993). 
 
The viewpoint of Sheikh Hassan al-Banna can be summarized in the concept of liberation of 
the Islamic nation from all foreign authorities, and the establishment of a free Islamic state in this 
free nation. Al-Banna believed that the Islamic world had the full right to govern itself in 
accordance with its religious principles, whose legitimacy was based on the Quran and the Sunnah. 
Therefore, he believed it was necessary to get rid of any Western influence in all the aspects of the 
public life of Muslims, including the political, economic and intellectual fields. Al-Banna devoted 
his life to strengthening his point of view through many books and letters to ensure the continuity of 
these thoughts regarding the Islamic nation. Among them there are “twenty principles to understand 
Islam”, in which he showed that Islam is a comprehensive system dealing with several aspects and 
based on the concepts of strength, mercy and justice. He viewed Islam as a culture, and a law or the 
science of jurists, and ‘jihad’ as an idea based on the doctrine of honesty and true worship. 
 
Discourse establishing an advanced stage of ‘jihad’:  
Al-Banna’s letter represents the infrastructure upon which the Muslim Brotherhood 
consecrated the idea of liberating the nation from Western domination and colonial control. These 
main points were also the reference upon which Abdullah Azzam based the fatwa that he issued to 
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call for the ‘jihad’ against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and that was followed by Osama Bin Laden, 
al-Zarqawi and al-Zawahiri.  
 
When dealing with the doctrine of ‘jihad’ in the view of the Muslim Brotherhood, one must 
not only keep in mind that this association laid the foundations of the principle of ‘jihad’ which was 
subsequently inherited by the jihadist extremist groups, but also that the important leaders of the 
organizations that were previously mentioned were indeed members of the group of the Muslim 
Brothers, such as Abdullah Azzam in Palestine, al-Zawahiri in Egypt, and before them al-
SayyidQutb, who strongly influenced al-Zawahiri in the formation of his ideas and beliefs. 
 
The doctrine of ‘jihad’ for the Muslim Brothers can be summarized by the slogan adopted 
by the group in the beginning of its activities, that is “Prepare yourselves”, meaning that the 
Muslims had to be as ready, organized and prepared as possible. But the question remained: 
prepared for what, when, where and how? 
 
As a matter of fact, the Muslim Brotherhood believes in the inevitability of the days of 
confrontation between Islam and the Muslims on the one hand and the infidels, Jews and the 
Crusaders, as they are usually called by the leaders of the extremist organizations, on the other. 
Consequently, they rely on this slogan to spread enthusiasm and courage among their following 
ranks in order to prepare them for the days of the expected big battle. 
 
This intellectual reference makes it easier for many of those involved in the ranks of the 
Muslim Brotherhood to integrate themselves easily into the ranks of extremist groups under the 
label of ‘jihad’, which is considered the only possible way for the liberation of society and men’s 
soul on the basis that they will gain the Paradise and the virgins as a result of such actions. Thus, 
these extremist groups train and prepare secretly and wait for the moment in which there will be a 
security or power vacuum and they will exploit the chance to emerge. 
 
These groups thrive on crisis to implement their plans, as this is what happened in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Libya and Egypt. Syria is the best proof of the practical application of 
the principle “Prepare yourselves”. I will provide in the following chapter a detailed explanation of 
the role played by crisis in providing suitable environment for the emergence of these groups. As 
for the emergence of radical movements in other countries that do not suffer from crisis, they won’t 
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hesitate a moment in the event of disruption, state of imbalance or security vacuum to tighten their 
grip on power, and if necessary also by force. 
 
Al-Zarqawi and the first attempt to establish a state: 
Al-Zarqawi has been described by CNN as a “lone wolf” who carried out his activities 
independently from the network of the organization of al-Qaeda.(Michel Chossudovsky 2015). The 
experts, who conducted interviews with his comrades in prison and with some of his previous 
acquaintances, reported that he spent his time in prison focusing on religious thought. Shortly after 
his release, he went looking for jihadist groups in Jordan. In early 1989, al-Zarqawi moved to 
Afghanistan, hoping to join the fight against the Soviet occupation. He spent most of the time in 
Peshawar, where he adopted the Salafi extremist approach, and the experts said this represented a 
fuel for his hostility towards the Shiite Islamic governments and moderate Muslims. Al-Zarqawi’s 
first steps intersected with Osama Bin Laden, and they worked together on the foundation of the 
jihadist groups to initiate the global “holy war”. Experts say that al-Zarqawi repeatedly refused to 
join the al-Qaeda organization of Bin Laden. Apparently, al-Zarqawi might not have met or 
responded to the insistence of Bin Laden on targeting the “far enemy” and the United States. 
Instead, al-Zarqawi directed his hostility towards Israel and the Jews in general, and towards Jordan 
because of his imprisonment in the mid-1990s. Al-Zarqawi formed a group called “Unity and 
Jihad” or “Al Tawheed wa Al Jihad”. “Unity and Jihad” group was financed in the beginning by the 
Afghan Taliban government, and focused its efforts on the training of suicide bombers in a number 
of camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan(Lee Hudson Teslik 2006). 
 
Osama Bin Laden had a great influence and a strong effect on those who attended the 
training camps “Afghan Arabs” in the country under the control of the Taliban, as he derived his 
legitimacy and prestige from the money he possessed, being one of the wealthiest Arab families in 
Afghanistan. Conversely, al-Zarqawi was seeking to establish a special training camp in the Afghan 
city of Herat with his followers, who were released with amnesty from the Jordanian prison at an 
earlier time. Bin Laden gave his support with small amounts of money, which lasted until 9/11. Al-
Zarqawi was based on the other side of Afghanistan, and his operations were very different, and 
sometimes interfered with the agenda of the organization of al-Qaeda.  Bin Laden tried to make al-
Zarqawi join the organization through a request of allegiance (oath of religious loyalty), but this 
offer was repeatedly rejected by al-Zarqawi (Y.Zelin 2003) 
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The emergence of the “Islamic State” by al-Zarqawi: 
After the invasion of Iraq, al-Zarqawi became a household name due to a spate of 
beheadings and suicide bombings against Shiite religious targets and Sunni civilians, and other 
operations. As a result of this reputation, many fighters expressed the desire to join him. There was 
a real need in the group to have a greater access to the resources to continue and expand the scope 
of their operations. Moreover, the strong desire of Bin Laden to annex the jihadist group in Iraq, all 
these dynamics made al-Zarqawi succumb to the desire of Bin Laden, and after eight months of 
negotiations al-Zarqawi declared in the magazine, Al-Battar Training Camp
1
 “MuaskarTadrib al-
Batar” in October 2014 “his pledge of allegiance and loyalty to Osama Bin Laden”, and renamed 
his group as ‘Organization of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia’ or as the organization of al-Qaeda in Iraq, 
and al-Zarqawi won the title of “Prince of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia”.. 
 
In 2005, al-Zawahiri sent a letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in which he planned to present 
his proposal to take control of Iraq after the evacuation of the US forces(Brian Whitaker 2005). In 
this letter, Ayman al-Zawahiri presented his four-stage plan starting with the control of Iraq, 
indicating that ‘jihad’ in Iraq required several additional goals summed up in four steps(al-Zawahiri 
2005).  
According to al-Zawahiri, the first step was to expel the Americans from Iraq. The second 
step was the establishment of an Islamic Emirate, developing it to the level of a caliphate to fill the 
vacuum that could have resulted from the expulsion of Americans and the missed opportunity by 
non-Muslims to seize power in Iraq. According to al-Zarqawi, there was no doubt that such an 
Emirate would enter into a fierce conflict with the foreign forces and with those supporting the 
occupying forces. It would have put them in a state of constant preoccupation making it impossible 
to establish a stable state and creating the chance to announce the Caliphate, keeping the Jihadist 
group in a permanent state of war, until the occupying forces are eliminated. As for the third step, 
this was the extension of the wave of ‘jihad’ to those secular states near Iraq. The fourth step was a 
conflict with Israel, as Israel was the last obstacle to the formation of a new Islamic entity. 
 
The letter of al-Zawahiri and the another one of Sheikh Atiyyah Al Libi – one of the most 
important theorists of the organization of al-Qaeda – reflect the frustration that started to grow in al-
Qaeda because of the continuing abuses of al-Zarqawi, as Sheikh Atiyyah Al Libi advised the 
necessity of mitigating violence and abuse in the enforcement of the law, because this was 
detrimental to the long-term goals of the global jihadist project. Nevertheless al-Zarqawi ignored 
                                                 
1
A Magazine Published by the Military Committee of the Mujahideen in the Arabian Peninsula. 
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both the suggestions. In 2006, al-Zarqawi held alliances with many other jihadist factions in Iraq 
and founded what was known as “The Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC)”, which gained much 
clout after the assassination of al-Zarqawi on 7 June 2006. 
 
Several months after the killing of al-Zarqawi, the Council issued a declaration called 
“Declaration for the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq”, in which Abu Hamza al-Muhajir – 
who took over the leadership of the organization of al-Qaeda in Iraq after the killing of Abu al 
Zarqawi – pledged his allegiance to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, who had by then come to be known as 
the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq. Later, after the killing of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the 
leadership of the Islamic State in Iraq was taken over by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the head of ISIS/ 
ISIL. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi took charge, refusing to pledge allegiance to the organization of al-
Qaeda(Y.Zelin 2003). 
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IV. Literature Review 
  The Core of Crisis: The Iraqi and Syrian crises have created hotbeds of conflicts that have 
become fertile ground for the growth of terrorist groups. This widening arc of terror from war-
ravaged Iraq to Syria could potentially pose real threats to the region and the rest of the world.  
The problem regions and countries where terrorism runs deep are not hard to find nor is it difficult 
to understand the reasons behind the growth of such insurgencies. The Global Terrorism Index 
2014:  ‘Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism’, which covers the 14 years from 
2000 till 2013, reveals that over 80 per cent of the lives lost to terrorist activity in 2013 occurred in 
only five countries -- Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. The majority of deaths were 
the result of terrorist attacks, as much as 66 per cent in 2013, by four terrorist organizations -- 
Islamic State, Boko Haram, the Taliban and Al Qaida and its affiliates. The Index’s findings point 
to the fact that religious ideology is a key motivation for terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
MENA region and South Asia. In the rest of the world, the raison d'être for terror is more likely to 
be driven by political or nationalistic and separatist movements. 
 
Fragile states 
The problem is compounded as many Arab and Muslim countries affected by violent jihad 
and terrorist activity are also characterized as failed states. Ever since the September 11 attacks in 
the US and the rise of Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan, the link between transnational terror 
networks and the role of failed states in facilitating global acts of terror is being studied. It should 
be noted that these countries have not collapsed completely, in spite of the nomenclature, but have 
lost control over large swathes of territory. They therefore cannot provide security to citizens, are 
internally divided by sectarian tensions and attrition, and at the same time exert authoritarian 
control over its citizens. 
Definition of state fragility: Some experts tend to use the term ‘fragile states’ instead of ‘failed 
states’. This approach ensures that instead of focusing on the nomenclature, the effort would be to 
address the root of the problem, taking steps to mitigate the causes. 
 
Alexandra Lewis, while analyzing criminal violence in Yemen, had listed some main 
manifestations that underpin state fragility – lack of territorial control, poor legitimacy, authority-
based weaknesses, and a lack of service delivery, particularly in relation to law enforcement and 
security delivery(Alexandra Lewis 2013). 
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Graziella Bertocchi and Andrea Guerzoni associated state fragility with various 
combinations of the following dysfunctions: inability to provide basic services and meet vital needs, 
unstable and weak governance, persistent and extreme poverty, lack of territorial control, and high 
propensity to conflict and civil war.(Bertocchi and Guerzoni 2010). 
 
Fragile State Index: When discussing state fragility, the concept has been largely framed 
with a focus on the debate centred around economic development. For the purposes of studying the 
patterns of transnational terror, and the spread of Islamic jihad in recent times, it would be more 
useful to examine the last available international classification on the subject. The Fragile States 
Index is an annual ranking of 178 nations based on their levels of stability and the pressures they 
face.  
As per the Fragile States Index 2014 (earlier called Failed States Index), the following Arab and 
Muslim countries affected by violent jihad occupied the top end of the list:  Somalia, Sudan were at 
the Very High Alert category with scores of 112.6 and 110.1 respectively out of 120. In the High 
Alert category were: Afghanistan (106.5), Yemen (105.4), Pakistan (103.0), Iraq (102.2) and Syria 
(101.6). Failed or fragile states posed a danger to international security because they produce 
conditions under which transnational terrorist groups could thrive. These states could be used to 
plan, execute, support and finance terrorist organizations. 
 
The 2014 Fragile States Index, the tenth edition of the annual Index, comprised data collected 
between January 1, 2013, and December 31, 2013. The lower the score in the Fragile States Index 
(FSI), the better. Therefore, a reduced score indicated an improvement, just as a higher score 
indicates greater instability. FSI methodology distilled millions of pieces of information about the 
existing social, economic and political pressures faced by each country that it analyzed into a form 
that was relevant, easily digestible and informative, using its proprietary Conflict Assessment 
Software Tool (CAST) analytical platform. Data from three primary sources were triangulated and 
subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI. Applying highly specialized search 
parameters, scores were apportioned for every country based on the following 12 indicators of 2 
category:  First, political and military, Second social and economic indicators (which in turn include 
over 100 sub-indicators): 
Social and Economic Indicators --  Demographic pressures, Refugees and IDPs, Uneven economic 
development, Group grievance, Human flight and brain drain, and Poverty and economic decline. 
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Political and military indicators -- State legitimacy, Public services, Human rights and the rule of 
law, Security apparatus, Factionalised elites and External intervention (Haken et al. 2014). 
 
When studying the Islamic jihad and the brand of transnational terror unleashed by Osama 
Bin Laden, one can perceive the role played by fragile or failed states in formulating and facilitating 
his strategy. 
Sudan for instance, the country in the Very High Alert category with scores of 112.6 on the Fragile 
States Index 2014, was the first place Bin Laden traveled to in 1991 after the war with Soviet 
forces. He spent the crucial five years in Sudan along with his foreign fighters of the Afghan war, 
until he was expelled in 1996 for his involvement in the east Africa embassy bombings(Astill 
2001). 
 
The existing literature on failed states or fragile states provide enough clues to what is 
happening in terms of terrorist violence and its propagation across borders, sectarian strife and 
frightening human toll at present in large parts of the Middle East from Iraq to Syria and now 
Yemen. 
 
Dominic Lisanti examined the subject of failed states and their propensity to breed terrorists. 
He had focused on terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1996 and 2007, and used both a 
quantitative and a fuzzy set of qualitative approach and compared the results. In both models, 
repression by the state and militarized conflict proved to be crucial predictors of terrorism.(Lisanti 
2010).  
 
On the other hand, the ties between state failure or democracy and terrorism remained 
ambiguous. A rise in probability of terrorist acts was linked to a rise in state-sponsored abuse of its 
citizens. Along with this, countries that were engaged in military dispute were likely to face an 
increase in terrorism.  
While terrorism and political violence could not be equated, and were not the same, they were 
linked to conflict. Figures examined showed a strong link between state repression and terrorism. 
There was also a significant link between military conflicts and terrorism, but not as significant as 
that between state repression and terrorism.  
 
In all cases, lack of conflict was a causal condition leading to low terrorism. High repression 
combined with militarized conflicts provided the baseline conditions for a variety of different paths 
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to high terrorism. Addressing the main question of state failure and rise in terrorism, the study, 
when restricted in time and space, did not substantiate such a link. The answer, according to the 
study, was yes and no. Yes, in some sense that in the fuzzy set qualitative approach, all the 
instances of state failure were accompanied by high rates of terrorism, but all the instances of state 
failure were also accompanied by conflict and repression. No, from the statistical models and a 
close examination of the cases because we know that at certain times, failed states do not have 
higher rates of terrorism. To the extent that state failure was accompanied by other potentially 
negative conditions it was related to high terrorism, but it was not sufficient in-and-of itself (Lisanti 
2010). 
According to James A. Piazza, states plagued by chronic state failures are more likely to 
host terrorist groups that commit trans-national attacks, have their nationals commit transnational 
attacks, and are potentially targeted by transnational terrorists themselves. The relationship between 
state failure and transnational terrorism was scrutinized. Failed and failing states are characterized 
by the lack of ability to project power internally. These countries provide the wherewithal for terror 
groups to organize, train, generate revenue and set up logistics and communications. Terrorist 
groups are able to develop their own capabilities with little governmental control or scrutiny – a 
phenomenon termed as the exploitation of ‘stateless areas’. Groups which plan to launch 
transnational attacks tend to use the autonomous space in failed or failing states to organize their 
logistical and training activity without having to evade the law. Another advantage for terrorist 
groups is that in such circumstances they can draw on a large pool of potential recruits from within 
such failed states. On the other hand, it has been argued by others that failed states made for a poor 
location for foreign terrorists planning clandestine operations. The chaotic conditions inside such 
countries could adversely affect terrorists themselves(Piazza 2008). 
 
Using the 2006 Failed States Index, the study found that countries categorized as the 
highest-at-risk for state failure (“Alert”) were on average most frequently the location of terrorist 
attacks; most frequently the source of transnational attacks abroad. States experiencing intense state 
failures are statistically more likely to be the targets of attacks and are more likely to have their 
nationals commit attacks overseas. The results of the study showed the linear relationship between 
intensity and pervasiveness of state failure and transnational terrorism. 
  
In the study, all types of state failures are linked to transnational attacks. All types of state 
failures are found to be positively associated with transnational attacks. The study supports the 
argument that states experiencing governability challenges are more prone to terrorism. Established, 
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homogenous regimes governing small populations while not being engaged in international war are 
less likely to be the source or target of transnational terrorism.  The focus of the war on terror 
should be to address the problem of failed and failing states. 
 
Piazza in an earlier study had advocated that “social cleavage theory” was better equipped to 
explain terrorism than were theories that link terrorism to poor economic development. He found 
that contrary to popular opinion, no significant relationship between any of the measures of 
economic development and terrorism could be determined. The direction of anti-terrorism policy 
should take into consideration the danger posed by poor and more developed divided societies 
posed to international security(Piazza 2006). 
 
Muslims in EU 
While the whole world has been focused on the turmoil in the Middle East and the new 
threat posed by the extreme violence touted by ISIS, the ideological battle of violent jihad is 
seeping in as well as being ostensibly sown effectively in Western Europe for more than a decade 
now. The increasingly daring attacks by Islamist jihadists and their followers and sympathizers in 
Western European cities in recent years and ever since the September 11 attacks in the US, have 
brought to the fore the condition of the rising population of Muslim immigrants and issues of 
integration in their adopted homeland, and pitted them ostensibly against the values and the 
prejudices of host societies, much to the chagrin of analysts and policymakers. The danger signs 
very well point to the fact that another much larger front to what is happening in the Middle East is 
being opened up by those masterminding the philosophy of Islamist terror and global dominance. 
 
Luring much larger forces into a long-drawn war designed to bleed them dry was the core 
strategy pursued by Osama Bin Laden and his cohorts. The alienated, disenchanted and disgruntled 
elements in the large Muslim immigrant communities in European cities could very well be the 
stand-bearers of this new battlefront if the drift in Europe is allowed to continue. 
But in the existing literature about the situation in the West, especially in Western Europe, whether 
it is in media analysis, in-depth comparative studies or surveys, a much more clearer and optimistic 
picture emerges with practical solutions laid out. Some of it presents new hope in ways 
unimaginable in the midst of the negative messages in the popular narrative. 
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Between Destination and Origins 
To what extent do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire 
the culture of their new home? Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris explored the answers to these 
questions as it would help us know to what extent cultural values endure and whether they are 
individual traits or derived from society(Norris and Inglehart 2012).  
The research design and the empirical evidence used in this study, drew upon the World Values 
Survey/European Values Study (WVS/EVS) dataset, from 1981‐2007. The study compared two 
types of societies: ORIGINS (Islamic Countries of Origin for Muslim migrants, comprising 20 
nations with plurality Muslim populations) and DESTINATIONS (Western Countries of 
Destination for Muslim migrants, comparing 22 OECD member states with Protestant or Roman 
Catholic majority populations).  
 
Alternate arguments of cultural integration and divergence in the backdrop about the 
experience of migration and cultural change and its potential consequences were examined. 
Inglehart and Norris focus on four important indicators, analyzing attitudes towards Gender 
equality, sexual liberalization, and comparing religious values and democratic attitudes. The 
analysis showed that the basic values of Muslims in the West were more or less mid-way between 
the dominant values prevailing within their countries of destination and origin. The result pointed to 
the fact that migrants in Europe are in the process of adapting to the host cultures, while continuing 
to hold on to values from their original countries of origin. The study also shows that living within 
an Islamic or Western society had a major impact on values than individual‐level religious 
identities, irrespective of an individual’s education, age, gender and income, lending support to the 
integration theory. 
  
Inglehart and Norris agree that cultural cleavages exit, but they are not monolithic. Evidence 
from the WVS/EVS (1999‐2001) indicate that while religious traditions have historically shaped 
national cultures, today their impact is transmitted mainly through nation‐wide institutions, to the 
population as a whole. This suggests that Muslims are not exceptionally resistant in levels of 
integration, as some studies show. Inglehart and Norris point out that cultural differences are a 
potential fault line that demagogues can exploit to inflame hatred between groups. But there is 
nothing inevitable about cultural conflict(Norris and Inglehart 2012). 
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The Rooted Tension 
Toni Johnson focused on the heightened tension between Western European nations and 
their Muslim populations as a result of several happenings in the last few years, namely the 2004 
Madrid and 2005 London attacks, the 2004 head scarf ban and the 2011 ban of the ‘burqa’ in 
France, 2005 Paris attacks, the 2006 Dutch cartoon protests and several prominent killings. Johnson 
noted that the Muslim population has been growing, and after the 9/11 attacks in the US, the 
community and religion have been at the centre of debate on subjects such as immigration policy, 
cultural identity and security. The July 2001 massacre in Norway by Breivik in protest against 
‘Islamization’ and multiculturalism served only to highlight this tension in Europe(Johnson 2011). 
 
Johnson cited other analysts to illustrate that Western Europe’s Muslims are generally not 
well integrated into the society and are often at odds with European values as exemplified by the 
closed ethnic areas, high crime rates, calls for sharia law and wearing of the veil. Fears about a 
looming population shift towards Islam and issues of Muslim assimilation serve to focus on the 
further split between the Muslim citizens and the states in Europe. It was during the rebuilding 
following World War II that immigration in Western Europe swelled and more immigrants came in 
to meet the needs of growth, for reunification with family or as asylum seekers. Issues of race and 
ethnicity came up following this influx. By 2009, European Union had 18.5 million non-EU 
nationals and 8 million illegal immigrants. In 2008, France had the largest number of Muslims at 8 
per cent of the population, followed by the Netherlands at 6 per cent, Germany at 4 per cent and the 
UK at 3 per cent. In some EU cities, Muslims crossed 20 per cent of the population. 
 
According to Johnson, integration and assimilation posed many problems for Muslims. 
Muslim populations in Europe are relatively poor and are segregated in crime-hit neighbourhoods. 
Rising crimes and welfare dependency adds to the European perception about the community. One 
of the reasons for tensions recently was the lack of economic opportunity and high joblessness. 
Experts are of the opinion that middle class Muslims are more likely to opt for assimilation but are 
also more likely to identify with their religion than their nationality. 
  
Interestingly, there is no monolith version of Islam in Europe because of the diversity in that 
region and there is hope for a strong Euro–Islam identity emerging in the future. But the presence of 
Muslims poses a strong test to the cultural and democratic values in Europe. A case in point was the 
2004 murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh for his film critical of Islam’s attitudes towards women. 
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Muslims also face discrimination as most of the immigrants are ethnically different and non-white, 
which add to the problems of integration. 
 
With regard to fears of radicalism, the dangers from alienated Muslim youth could be met 
by the increased diversity among the Muslim community. Johnson alluded to the policy 
implications going forward regarding the issue of integrating Muslims into Europe and cited 
analysts and scholars on the best way forward. The consensus seemed to be to emphasis socio-
economic issues rather than cultural differences, and toning down the political and media rhetoric 
on terror and Muslims as a group (Johnson, 2011). 
 
According to Uriya Shavit, the fight over the veil in Europe was used by some experts to 
explore the topic of Muslim integration in the West, and the division created by two types of 
nationality and two sources of legitimacy. While Muslim jurists in earlier times had mostly opposed 
Muslims from residing in non-Muslim societies arguing that it weakens their faith and practice, 
there was no absolute ban. It was only after World War II that Muslim migration from Islamic 
countries began increasing. And for the last three decades Muslim jurists had been re-examining the 
issue of identity and duties of emigrants. They took a common approach of not opposing migration 
to the West. Instead, they focused on creating a legal religious framework to maintain the emigrant’ 
Muslim identity, and use the diaspora to help serve Islam.(Shavit 2007). 
 
Shavit attributed the newfound religiosity among Muslims in the West to the rise of political 
Islam at a time when pan-Arabism waned. Fears about Western culture trying to undermine Muslim 
societies led to the thinking among clerics in the Arab world to use Muslim immigrants as a weapon 
to undermine Western societies. Contemporary Middle East politics had seen authoritarian regimes 
in the Middle East suppressing Islamists at home while aiding them in exporting their ideology. 
Many Muslims who had migrated after World War II, are now permanent European citizens, 
financially secure with rising levels of political awareness. The prospect of being surrounded by a 
large community of non-Muslims led to introspection about their identity, which coincided with 
Western advocacy of multiculturalism. As the second generation of migrants grew up, Western 
liberalism proved a challenge to the conservative values of Islam. The response from parents was to 
reaffirm the religious identity of their families. Meanwhile, the Islamic jurists retroactively 
developed a legal structure to legitimize migration, provided that Muslims in the West held 
steadfast to their religion. The change in viewpoint by jurists were for a variety of reasons – benefits 
of proselytizing, strengthening Muslim unity, opportunity to advance the divine plan for the world, 
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and establishing a new frontier in defense of Islam. While these jurists insisted that Muslim 
immigrants must avoid assimilation, they also held forth about obeying the law of the host countries 
and urged them not to harm the security of those states. They viewed Western states as mere social 
mechanisms where Muslims can practice Islam fully. Besides, with the moral and spiritual void in 
the Western civilization prompted these jurists to believe that ultimately Westerners may move 
towards Islam. 
 
According to Shavit, not all Muslims accepted such a view. Some of them were of the 
opinion that Muslim immigrants’ role was to improve the image of Islam in the West. Many 
European Muslims do not follow or reject the position put forth by jurists. Even while advocating a 
conservative dress code for Muslim women, they sought integration into European society. These 
pro-assimilation views were drowned out by the jurists operating from the Arab world, but the clash 
between Western interpretations of personal freedom and Islamists’ stand on Muslim rights and 
duties could not be avoided. The challenge from Arab Muslim jurists was that they viewed the 
Muslim nation as encompassing the boundaries of all nation-states. Liberal nation-states in the West 
would have to deal with this existential conundrum by focusing more on the individuals and the 
ideas motivating them and moving away from superficial issues like the veil and the dress code 
(Shavit 2007). 
 
Charlie Hebdo 
Gawdat Bahgat argued, in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo massacre, for an all-encompassing 
political strategy in the long run, instead of focusing only on law-enforcement measures. While the 
right wing political parties in France and Germany had responded using anti-immigration electoral 
platforms to gain ground in the European Parliament, European leaders like French President 
Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel had countered this by reaching out to 
Muslims in their countries.(Bahgat 2015). 
 
Bahgat highlighted two important propositions that need to be highlighted about the debate 
about Islam’s compatibility with Western values, as some claimed that there was an ideological war 
between Islam and the West. First, for more than half a century millions of immigrants from North 
Africa (and elsewhere) had arrived in Europe attracted by work and welfare prospects and the hope 
of getting to live in a haven away from wars and political instability. Most of them had contributed 
to Europe’s economic prosperity. On the other hand, efforts at assimilation into European societies 
Page 29 of 53 
 
achieved very modest success, and marginalized Muslim communities providing fertile ground for 
extremism. At the same time, the number of Muslims in Europe was large and growing.  
Second, this notion of ideological war assumed that Islam or militant Islam was monolithic. 
Muslims, like followers of other religions, had different interpretations of their religion. 
Stereotyping and generalizations could help to mobilize angry crowds but undermined efforts to 
understand Muslim communities in Europe. Instead, a better approach at countering terror than 
promoting ideas of an ideological war between the two sides would be to examine and address the 
socio-economic and political issues. Underdevelopment and political instability in South and East 
Mediterranean States were major forces behind terrorist attacks in Europe(Bahgat 2015). 
 
James M. Dorsey compared the attack on the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris to Al 
Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks in the US. In Dorsey’s view, the attacks would have long-term repercussions 
on the policy of multiculturalism, the hallmark of the European response to immigration in their 
societies. Post 9/11, there were hurried moves to integrate foreign migrants but those policies did 
not go as far to counter the economic and social marginalization of those immigrant groups, 
resulting in more alienation as well as radicalization by youths who sympathized with Islamic 
countries and societal groups ravaged by war and sectarian strife.(Dorsey 2015) 
 
Dorsey contended that this, in a way, aided Al Qaeda’s cause. Like 9/11, the Paris attacks 
aimed not only on Western freedoms and on society, but also to intensify the divisions in French 
society between the majority population and immigrants. The jihadist plan was to force Muslim 
communities in the West who reject violence as a policy and seek to integrate in their adopted 
societies to feel that they were no longer welcome, by masterminding the majority sentiment against 
Muslims and foreigners. 
Dorsey likened the 9/11 attack a watershed in triggering intolerance and suspicion about immigrants 
and identifying Muslims on the side of the enemy in the war on terror. Al Qaeda triggered the 
policies in the West that only served to feed on the long-festering anger and frustration among the 
marginalized minority. This had resulted in the swelling of foreign fighters who join the Islamic 
State, the jihadist group operating in Iraq and Syria. This polarization strategy had also fuelled the 
sectarian confrontation between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East. 
 
Right wing parties in Europe (France, UK and Germany) had been quick to exploit this 
sentiment for electoral gains. The reaction of many Western leaders and authorities to any act of 
terror mirrors what followed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, putting the Muslim community 
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that has nothing to do with violence on the defensive. The result, as Dorsey predicts, was 
polarization that engendered radicalization. But the civil society in Europe had resisted this 
Islamophobia. Dorsey pointed out that the response of Norway to Breivik’s deadly attack should 
serve as a model elsewhere. Norway held on to its democratic values, treated the perpetrator as a 
criminal, and resisted from declaring war on terror (Dorsey, 2015). 
 
Peter Bergen discussed the Paris attacks and whether it had links to Islam and asserted that 
one could not wish away the connection, even though Muslims who rejected fanatical beliefs did 
not have any responsibility for what happened. The three terrorists involved in the attacks believed 
they were holy warriors defending Islam. In the ‘martyrdom’ video of one of the terrorists, he 
pledged his allegiance to the ISIS leader and addressed him as the caliph. Osama Bin Laden also 
had quoted a Quranic verse before his declaration of war against “the Jews and the Crusaders” in 
1998. In the Middle East, Sunni and Shiite fundamentalists were locked in a vicious religious civil 
war covering Iran, Syria and Yemen, killing hundreds of thousands. The Salafism prevalent in 
Saudi Arabia fuelled intolerance against Shia Islam, as well as other religions, and at the same time 
restricted women to a role largely confined to the domestic sphere. The Salafism of the terrorists 
behind the Paris attacks was a highly political version what Bin Laden propagated. The ideology of 
‘Bin Ladenism’ centres around the belief that the world would finally be made perfect by the 
restoration of a Taliban-style caliphate. Supporters of Bin Ladenism consider as evil the people and 
countries that they perceive as standing in the way of the goal(Peter Bergen 2015). 
 
Minorities, Majorities 
In Tahir Abbas’ view, the rift between minorities and majorities is increasing on issues of 
social cohesion and identity politics. In this regard, Americans generally have managed better. 
European culture is at present inward looking, with politicians moving to the right. The French ban 
on the veil and the Swiss ban on minarets revealed a lack of ideas. Abbas notes that when the US 
opened up to immigration in the mid-60s, it attracted highly educated immigrants, including 
Muslims from Asia and the Middle East.(Tahir Abbas 2015). 
  
Muslim migrants in Europe on the other hand found themselves at the bottom of the job 
market. Many of those migrant Muslim communities have become trapped in poor localities, 
similar to white-majority working class communities. In the case of Muslim minorities, they were 
identified by their faith, rather than race. Most French Muslims live in poor housing, have low-pay 
jobs, and low education levels. Matters are getting worse for Muslims in Europe on the political, 
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social and cultural fronts. Islamophobia also prevents dialogue within the Muslim community, 
besides dividing and driving extremism on all sides. This has also negated the positive cultural 
contributions by European-born Muslims in fashion, music, food, dance, literature and film. Abbas 
concedes that both the US and Europe have exhibited major Islamophobia problems. But it is at the 
local level that the conflicts exist and where the greater challenges lie. While many minorities and 
majorities are moving away from each other, Abbas suggests a grassroots level building up of 
opportunities and a top down delivery of effective policy by politicians (Tahir Abbas 2015). 
 
Toward a Reconciliation of Islam and the West 
Jocelyne Cesari described the contrasting images of Islam on the two sides of the Atlantic, 
showing up the more conflictual and hostile attitudes in Europe. Cesari contended that the common 
factor was the influence of global politics on the domestic situation of minority Muslims and the 
tendency to conflate Islam as an international political force with ordinary Muslims living in 
minority populations in the West(Cesari 2007). 
  
Long before September 11 attacks in the US, there was the fear of political Islam alongside 
the one-sided view of Islam, which encouraged stereotypical connections between the religion, 
violence and fanaticism and obscuring all other aspects of the Muslim world. The past two decades 
had however thrown up many indelible images of the militant version of Islam and Islamic 
revivalism was considered a synonym for global terrorism by the general public. Cesari explained 
that it was in this climate that scholars were delving into issues of Muslim integration and whether 
it was comparable to the process other immigrants had undergone. Cesari notes that the process of 
victimization among European Muslims was already in motion long before the September 11 
attacks. Academic research about the Muslim community and the religion had already been 
affected. Anti-Islamic discourse had failed to note the fluid and contradictory reality of Islam’s 
integration into western societies. Cesari viewed Muslim immigration to Europe and North America 
as the foundational moment of a new transcultural space that needs analysis in the light of 
globalization and urged that instead of trying to discover what constitutes the essential quality of 
Islam, one should examine the social and historical contexts within which Muslims create their 
discourse. 
 
Cesari examined dimensions of Muslim life in the West that held significance to identity and 
religious practice – the Meta narrative on Islam, political and cultural differences, and ethnicity 
versus religion, and global Islam. Western Muslims had always been seen as the enemy, more so 
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after the September 11 attacks. In such a scenario, Muslims adopted three modes of integration, 
acceptance, avoidance or resistance. Resistance could be taking an opposing stance to dominant 
narrative, by using Islamic symbols, clothing or behavior. It could also take a radical form by way 
of allegiance to militant movements. 
 
Cesari noted that of the common things both European and American Muslims shared was 
the importance of the local community in Muslim identity-formation. The visibility and legitimacy 
of the new generation of Islamic leadership now coming into its own was nearly always grounded in 
local and community-based activities. The disputes that occurred at the local level fed into the 
national debate on Islam and this, in turn, influenced the debate on Islam and its politics. 
  
In both Europe and the US, Islam was inseparable from ethnic identities, especially for first 
generation immigrants. But since the 1990s, ‘trans-ethnic’ forms of Islam have emerged. A similar 
process was taking place in the US, with the search for ‘true Islam’ which would fit in better within 
American society. While Global Islam was in crisis, Muslims in Europe and the United States 
served as a sort of lightning rod. Their position crystallized the debates and controversies that were 
currently shaking the entire Muslim world: the question of democracy, Muslim relationship to 
others, the status of women, the lure of fundamentalism. 
 
Cesari, however, pointed out that there are hints of a renaissance in Islam. Islamic practices 
are being revamped and secularized, and Islamic thought is at a peak of activity. Islamic reformers 
by virtue of their role in shaping trans-national Islamic thought are introducing a new narrative of 
reconciliation between Islam and the West. But even so, many are still trapped in the mode of 
reaction and defensiveness when faced with Western anti-Islamic sentiment. The real challenge 
ahead is the current tension inside western Muslim communities -- one reformist and the other 
radical. But much would depend on western government policies – domestic as well as foreign -- 
that are often seen as hostile to Islam(Cesari 2007). 
 
Implications for Muslim integration 
Claire Adida, David Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort (2015) while discussing the Paris 
attacks say they fear the worst for Muslim integration in France. They point to the systematic 
discrimination against Muslims. Muslim immigrants stand out culturally in French society in ways 
that threaten republican ideals. This gets exacerbated into a ‘vicious circle of discrimination’. The 
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recent violence will only add to this state of affairs. There is a false equivalency between ‘Muslim’ 
and ‘jihadist’ in France.(Claire Adida 2015).  
The authors hold the view that the alienation of Muslims in France will make them opt for 
the viral cults that are propagated on internet and in mosques. A solution will depend on effecting 
changes from both sides. Reforms in employment and educational sector could be an effective way 
to end discrimination against French Muslims. Moderate Islam should also weigh in on solutions to 
this impasse. One of the ways would be to train the imams in France – currently, under 10 per cent 
of France’s 1,800 imams are trained in the country. Recognizing the ‘discriminatory equilibrium’ 
between the French and its recently arrived Muslim immigrants offers a more positive prospect for 
their integration into French society(Claire Adida 2015). 
 
While the various formulations by experts have laid bare the historical and contemporary 
conditions of Muslim migration to the US and Western Europe, and some of the approaches to 
problem solving and issues of integration, the time has come for both sides to forge a realistic, 
workable, long-lasting solution. Policies of multiculturalism promoted in the West after the large-
scale post-World War II immigration has failed in addressing the issues following the Millennium. 
Instead of the ‘rooted’ and the ‘migrant’ distinctions, there has to be an understanding that the only 
prospect in the days ahead is going to be a shared future and a commitment to universal values. 
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V. Theoretical framework: 
This thesis focuses on fragile states that we previously mentioned, in order to test the hypothesis 
about this concept as a key perpetuating factor in the emergence of two main dilemmas each of 
which leads to increased resonance on the subject of integration of immigrant communities in 
Europe and of Muslim communities in particular. The first dilemma is the increasing armed 
conflicts based on religious and sectarian grounds, and the second is the lack of the basic elements 
that guarantee a decent standard of living, quality education, health care, and security-related 
repression and the suppression of freedoms and other basic rights in these countries. 
 
 These dilemmas push the communities in those countries to escape the harsh reality in which 
they live in order to search for countries that can guarantee them a decent living, security and peace. 
This leads to the waves of immigration by many communities and at their forefront, Muslim 
communities, to developed countries such as those in Europe. These waves of migration increase as 
the countries of origin become more fragile and prone to collapse. This equation ensures that the 
dialogue on integration continues to exist, but it is intensified when it comes to talk about the 
Muslim communities and their being affected by terrorist acts committed in the name of religion, 
especially if one of the members of these communities is directly involved in these groups and 
subsequently carries out any violent act in European countries. 
 
When examining state failure and rise in transnational terror it has been observed time and again 
that when compounded by state repression along with armed military conflict, the linkage with 
terror becomes more strong (Lisanti 2010). 
 
Abdelkerim Ousman has described in detail the ideas and methods in which radical elements 
from outside are exploiting the conditions of fragility in sub-Saharan Africa such as Sudan, Nigeria 
and Chad, and destabilising and delegitimizing the existing systems in play, and also encouraging 
the formation of groups which act against the state (either violently or subversively). These 
processes, the study points out, exacerbate existing fragility and increase conflicts among 
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communities in countries that already suffer from poor social cohesion and integration (Ousman 
2012). 
 
German sociologists Max Weber in his 1919 lecture ‘Politics as a Vocation’ defines his subject 
by focusing on the ‘State’. He asks what is a  ‘political’ association from the sociological point of 
view? Sociologically, the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends. Weber contends that 
ultimately, that the modern state can be defined “sociologically only in terms of the specific means 
peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of physical force. “The monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical force, or the monopoly on violence, is the defining conception of the 
state. (Tickamyer 1981) 
Force, Weber goes on, is a “means specific to the State.” Conceptually, according to Weber, 
“the modern state is a compulsory association which organizes domination. It has been successful in 
seeking to monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a 
territory.” The state can enforce its authority in its territory through force without losing its 
legitimate authority. In the 20th Century, this definition of the state has gained prominence in law 
and in political philosophy. Thus, use of force is acceptable, in the jurisdiction specified by the 
state's lands. Such a monopoly over violence, according to Weber, must occur via a process of 
legitimation. 
 
Weber notes that the connection between the state and the use of physical force has not always 
been so close. He cites the examples of feudalism, where private warfare was permitted under 
certain conditions, and of religious courts, which had sole jurisdiction over some types of offenses 
like heresy and sex crimes ("bawdy courts"). Regardless, the state exists wherever a single authority 
can legitimately authorize violence. The state's main instruments of legitimate violence need not be 
necessarily the police and military. Private force can also be used, too, with its legitimacy flowing 
from the state. The "monopoly" means that the state is the only source of legitimacy for all physical 
coercion or adjudication of coercion.  
  
The right of self-defense by which civilians acting on their own behalf may engage in violence 
for the sake of defending one's own life or the lives of others, is a private form of legitimate 
violence that is recognized by the state. Weber also categorises social authority into disparate forms, 
terming them as charismatic, traditional, and rational-legal. The bureaucracies associated with 
modern state institutions are increasingly based on rational-legal authority. 
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The assumption, which stems from Weber's thought, is that when this monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force is broken, the state turns into a failed or fragile state. Fragile states cannot 
achieve that and therefore they cannot exercise enough sovereignty on a variety of areas such as 
education, housing, welfare etc. Fragile states generally cannot assure basic security, maintain rule 
of law and justice, or provide services and economic opportunities for citizens. 
VI. Methodology: 
The goals of the thesis project are to answer the question: why do terrorist groups continue to 
grow and are in a state of permanent renewal? It is also to test the hypothesis that the fragility of 
states in the Middle East and the lack of integration with the West are largely responsible for the 
success of violent jihadi projects. I have adopted this thesis using primarily secondary sources to 
obtain information, such as jihadist websites that could be accessed, as well as articles, documents 
and research available online in order to provide a better understanding of the roots and complicated 
history of the evolution of violent jihadist ideology and its current form, as well as the effects 
resulting from it today. This methodology has been clearly used in the section on the historical 
background of the doctrine of jihad being pursued by jihadist groups today. An example of this is 
the letter sent by the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Hassan al-Banna to King Farouk 
and which presents the most important features of his vision for the progress of Islamic states in 
accordance with the rule of Islamic law, at their forefront being Egypt, and which contains a 
reference for the formation of a military force in support of the principle of Islamic Jihad in the 
liberation of Islamic states. It is a very useful letter that establishes the general atmosphere of the 
subject of the doctrine of jihad and its development. 
 
In the section dedicated to previous research related to discussing the subject of fragile states, 
the Fragile States Index, which is an annual ranking of 178 states based on their levels of stability 
and the amount of pressure they face, was relied upon, for the purpose of studying the patterns of 
trans-border terrorism and the spread of Islamic jihad in recent years. It will be much more 
interesting to study the latest international classification available on this subject, in order to 
provide a clear perception on the most important criteria used in analysing the degree of fragility of 
states within the economic and social situation indicators on one hand, and the political and military 
situation on the other (Haken et al. 2014). The Global Terrorism Index of 2014 was also used. 
Measuring and understanding the effects of terrorism, the report pointed out that 80% of those 
killed as a result of terrorist activities during 2013, were located in only five countries – Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria – and that the majority of those killed by terrorist attacks 
in 2013 (66%), occurred due to four terrorist organizations namely – Islamic State, Boko Haram, 
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Taliban and Al-Qaeda and its branches. All of these organizations are active in the countries 
referred to by the Fragile States Index of 2014 as those that have the highest levels of fragility. I 
also relied on various academic research linking fragile states to the subject of terrorism, and which 
describe those states as incubators that support the emergence of terrorism as a result of the security 
vacuum in which they exist, for example(The Institute for Economics and Peace IEP 2014).  
 
With respect to linking the concept of jihad belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood and terrorist 
organizations, the thesis relied upon the relationship between the texts and ideas that emanated from 
the Muslim Brotherhood as a first step, and on the development of the concept of Jihad and the 
establishing of an Islamic state as espoused by later leaders known to have belonged to this 
international organization such as Abdullah Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri. The historical 
introduction contains a detailed explanation of this point as it relates to the evolution of jihadist 
rhetoric, and the ease of entry and integration of those belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood among 
jihadist and terrorist groups if they wished to do so. 
 
With regards to the section concerning the subject of integration of Muslim communities, I 
attempted in this thesis to submit views and opinions such as opinion pieces, research and studies 
which revolve around the subject, by referring to global events related to terrorism and the resulting 
Islamophobia, as well as the Hijab debate in France, the prohibition of minarets in Switzerland, and 
the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris which resulted in bringing to the fore the debate on integration 
and the role of Muslim communities in rejecting / encouraging terrorist activities. The state of 
conflict or loss felt by immigrant communities in Europe, be it through effects felt from their 
countries of origin or countries of destination and the reconciliation between the two, is also looked 
at. 
  
The aim of relying on these sources is to try to draw a comprehensive framework of overlapping 
topics on the issue of integration, in order to be able to shed light on areas that have remained 
somewhat neglected for one reason or another, among them being the sensitivity surrounding this 
subject among Muslim communities due to it providing a painful wake-up call for recognizing 
points of imbalance and weakness for which Muslim communities themselves are responsible, and 
which stand as an obstacle to the achievement of integration. These include being misled by Muslim 
scholars and the subject of following Fatwa without thinking about matters intellectually and 
logically -- in other words, distancing themselves from the sanctification of ignorance, and textual 
explanations provided by the elders and preachers. 
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VII. Limitations: 
It is worth noting here the difficulty in obtaining more sources related to the topics on jihadists 
and the Muslim Brotherhood due to the banning of all the sites related to these groups by the 
security authorities in the United Arab Emirates, and I therefore avoided direct wading in trying to 
provide a deeper analysis of the jihadist rhetoric which is so rampant right now, and have sufficed 
myself with some published sources such as the letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi which contain some initial signs of the emergence of the so-called Islamic State. This has 
been discussed in detail in the historical background. I also relied upon a document titled 
‘Management of Savagery’ in analysing the methodology followed by terrorist groups in the 
process of constant renewal, and in implementing their global jihadist agenda, according to a set of 
plans that are described in detail in the results and analysis chapter therein. This is a document (in 
Arabic, which is my mother tongue, and its English translation published by some websites) which I 
obtained from a friend. 
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VIII. Findings and Analysis 
Before going into the discussion of the most important conclusions and analyses related to the 
subject of the thesis, I would like to refer to the methodology which I will follow in providing my 
analysis, based on several studies of the many overlapping issues of relevance. This methodology is 
represented by two main points upon which I built my thesis: namely, an attempt to explain and 
analyse the strategy followed by these terrorist groups when reviving themselves from time to time, 
and the other point is the discussion of the impact of terrorist activity around the world on Muslim 
communities in Europe specifically, and how they are affected and react, and where the flaw lies in 
their handling of the distancing of their religion from terrorist acts by one of its members. I then go 
on to a case of constructive self-criticism of these communities due to their failure in creating a 
state of openness and self-criticism, and recognition of their own flaws, which I then attempt to 
offer a remedy. 
 
There are many questions that revolve in the minds of people, whether they are Muslims or 
otherwise, about the reason for the renewed phenomenon of terrorism and the emergence of violent 
extremist groups one after the other.  We are witnessing a process of emergence of these groups, 
similar to the re-branding processes which occur every ten years or so in the realm of business, from 
the emergence of the Taliban to what is today known as the Islamic State under the leadership of 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It is of course a question of reiteration, as everyone knows that the aim of 
these extremist and violent organizations, is to seek to establish the concept of the Islamic caliphate 
so that it becomes a reality. They waste no opportunity to revive this goal again and again. During 
this thesis I attempted to address an area that is a bit absent from the questions people ask, and I 
sought to discuss and test it in order to try to add another dimension that may help in understanding 
the mentality that motivates these groups. After having reviewed the research works which I 
referred to in the previous section, I found that there is a strategy according to which these violent 
jihadi groups reinvent themselves and thereby renew the call for the emergence of an Islamic state. 
Today we face a reality in which these groups have gotten to the point which I see as a point of no 
return, where the emergence of a real state carrying the name of the ‘Islamic caliphate’ has started 
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to appear in the border region between Iraq and Syria, in a scenario where both countries are in 
deep crises. Some might say that it is a hasty conclusion to make in considering that this state has 
become a reality, but in view of the activities carried out by this terrorist group between the Syrian 
and Iraqi border, I am of the view that that they only lack the recognition of some states to give 
them a kind of international legitimacy. This group exercises activities that suggest to everyone that 
they are a quasi-state which exists and is recognized. These activities include the imposition of 
taxes, educational curricula changes, setting up of internal policing departments as well as courts, 
and the sale of oil among others which are considered normal for any state in the world. 
 
In order to explore the hypothesis I set ahead to: Why do terrorist groups continue to grow 
anew while they are in a state of permanent renewal? Moreover, more importantly, how do they 
manage to renew themselves (as I have pointed out previously in several examples)?  This remains, 
I believe, subject to our understanding of the references upon which these groups depend on when 
renewing and reinventing themselves, and when supporting its real presence and strength at the 
same time. Observers of the growth time-frame of these groups will note this point with certainty, 
that they are in a permanent renewal process. But what is interesting is that their re-emergence is 
linked to specific periods of time, and during specific events in the past few decades. Questioning 
the goal behind these groups and their renewal is a waste of time and effort, because everyone is 
aware that these groups are engaged in a global standoff through which they aim to establish the 
Caliphate state. This is their aim and nobody disagrees on this. 
 
In order to try to understand the reasons behind the emergence of jihadist movements and the 
continued advance and innovation made in achieving military progress or to carry out terrorist 
operations on the ground, we find that this thesis which has been addressed in the earlier chapter, 
has mostly revolved around the idea that these groups essentially benefit from areas of tension and 
conflict. Moreover, these groups organise themselves and consolidate their presence and bases, 
especially in those areas that are related to the countries of the Islamic world. The thesis also 
attributes the reason to the fragility of these states, resulting from several factors, which include 
conflicts of all kinds and wars whereby these groups always benefit in two important ways -- in 
luring the youth to joining their jihadi operations, and to carry out terrorist attacks wherever they 
find the opportunity to do so. 
    
What is meant by areas of tension and conflict in this thesis are those countries that suffer from 
various crises, and these include: occupation by one state by another, uprisings, popular revolutions, 
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and military coups. Most of these scenarios have occurred in the Islamic world, for example the 
occupation of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan which eventually led to the formation of Al Qaeda 
under the leadership of Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri and the ensuing global war on terror, the 
military coup in Sudan, where Bin Laden took refuge after Afghanistan, the American occupation 
of Afghanistan in 2001, the American occupation of Iraq in 2003, the sectarian war in Iraq triggered 
by al-Zarqawi, and the civil war in Syria, Libya and Yemen after the Arab Spring uprisings. 
 
All the examples given above lead us to a general factor applicable in all of these situations, 
namely the chaos that accompanies a large security and military vacuum as a result of the dispersion 
of the efforts of the regular armed forces of these countries and the weakness of its control over its 
borders and ports, which in turn assists the Mujahideen in their cross-border operations to these 
areas and their quick establishment of organizations and groups to carry out specific tasks according 
to a pre-determined strategy, just as it happened in Syria when control of the border by the Assad 
regime was weakened. This enabled a large numbers of jihadists from various backgrounds to enter 
Syria. According to the combat doctrine pursued by terrorist groups, the state of chaos that we have 
mentioned previously, is followed by savagery, brutality and then its management strategy.. 
 
 
The Management of Savagery 
   If we are to find a solution to stop the scenario of renewal by these extremist groups, we must 
understand the strategy that they are working to implement, and this is the management of 
savagery, which is the practical guide presented by Abu Bakr Naji 
1
 to the Jihadi groups as a road 
map toward the establishment of the dream of the Caliphate State. ‘The Management of Savagery’ 
as a methodology or strategy was summarized as a document written by Naji in Arabic, 
predominantly a religious discourse in accordance with the method of preaching and guidance. A 
translated version is available in English.(Naji 2006) 
 
In the introduction to his book or document titled ‘The Management of Savagery’, Naji 
classifies Islamist movements that have developed written programs to get the Islamic nation 
through the phase of humiliation and weakness - as he puts it – and to return it to a state where it 
leads the world, into five streams:  Salafist Jihadism, Awakening Salafism as represented by Sheikh 
Salman al-Awda, the Muslim Brotherhood as represented by the original movement in Egypt and 
the international organizations that follow it, the Muslim Brotherhood followed by Hassan al-Turabi 
in Sudan, and the Popular Jihad represented by Hamas. Naji describes the phase of management of 
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savagery as the most dangerous phase that the Islamic nation is yet to go through, and he regards 
that success in the management of this stage will inevitably lead to the revival of the Islamic State 
after the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate. Naji describes savagery as that which occurs when large and 
small states collapse, be they Islamic or non-Islamic, and whereby no neighbouring state or  powers 
close to the state that has fallen is able to control the collapsed territory. Naji uses the example of 
the fall of the Ottoman Empire after the Sykes-Picot Treaty, which he sees as having divided the 
Caliphate and turned it into small states, as being the crucial stage that stood in the face of the 
expansion of the Caliphate. 
 
Naji mentions in his document on the modern revival of the doctrine of Jihad among 
Muslims in general to the high level of fighting displayed by the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and 
other regions such as Chechnya and Tajikistan, and he constantly provides examples of the ability 
of these groups to manage savagery by providing many stories about Abdullah Azzam and Syed 
Qutub and their respective analyses that predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union. He holds the 
view that the management of savagery has been very successful in these areas in the establishment 
of projects for the Caliphate, despite them being later dropped. The experience gained by the jihadi 
movement over thirty years in fighting enabled the ‘Contemporary Renewal Movement’ to carry 
out specialist operations that began with Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in order to achieve several 
goals, the most important being inspiring confidence in the hearts of Muslims by breaking part of 
the prestige of the United States and removing the aura surrounding it as an invincible state 
superpower. The other goal was to compensate for the human losses suffered by the revival 
movement due to the fighting over thirty years by attracting new recruits through military 
operations against the United States that dazzle them, and by using the anger caused by American 
intervention in the Islamic world. 
 
In the Management of Savagery document, Naji continuously refers to the situation in 
Afghanistan when it was at war with the Soviet Union. He describes the stage that preceded the 
Taliban control of the area as being subject to the law of the jungle, where people were looking for 
someone, whether good or bad, to manage the savagery. Charles Lister has assessed Islamic State’s 
considerable organisational strengths in terms of commanding revenue sources and fund 
governance provide administrative and social services to the civilians in the areas it controls. It also 
has the leadership capability – from the command level to regional and local levels -- to redeploy 
men and resources to new areas it seeks to occupy. 
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  According to Naji’s view of the management of savagery, the organization that works on 
this administrative task should take care of some basic things such as the deployment of internal 
security, food and healthcare, securing the areas of savagery from enemy raids, the establishment of 
Shariah judiciary, raising the combat efficiency by creating a combat-ready society in all of its 
categories, working to achieve scalability and the ability to wage war against enemies, and establish 
alliances. 
 
 These tasks referred to are all practised today to the letter by the ‘Islamic State’ 
organization under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. What is striking about the subject of 
the management of savagery is that it converges at multiple points with the letter addressed by 
Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi – which I referred to in the historical background – 
especially with respect to the second step among the four steps proposed by al-Zawahiri to al-
Zarqawi, which is the establishment of the Islamic Emirate and developing it until it reaches the 
level of the Caliphate. This would fill the void that may exist when the Americans leave Iraq. This 
is the essence of the management of savagery according to Naji, the phase he describes as the law 
of the jungle, such as what occurred after the collapse and withdrawal of the Soviet Union from 
Afghanistan. There is a debate within Islamic circles about this, with ideas, information, knowledge 
exchanged, discussed such as what took place between al- Zawahiri and al-Zarqawi. 
 
The scenario of renewal followed by these groups is moving in accordance to what has been 
described in the Management of Savagery document as “the Path to Empowerment" – a 
comprehensive concept made up of three stages for the emergence of the Caliphate State. The first 
stage: Hitting and exhausting the enemy; the second stage: The management of savagery; and the 
third stage: the strength of empowerment 
2. 
 He also offers within these three stages a range of 
candidate countries that one should focus on towards implementing this strategy. Naji is of the view 
that these countries (or regions) – he prefers to call them regions seeing as he does not recognize the 
borders drawn up by the Sykes-Picot Treaty – are to be viewed as initial nominees and that at a later 
stage, focus will be placed on two or three countries in order to ensure the viability of the 
population of these countries to move towards Jihad. 
 
In reviewing the countries Naji sees as candidates for these three stages we find that they 
include: Jordan; the Arab Maghreb: Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco; Nigeria; the land of the Two 
Holy Mosques: Saudi Arabia and Yemen, taking into account that he does not recognise the borders 
of any state according to the concepts of the United Nations, whereby he confirmed that he uses the 
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term ‘region’ and not ‘state’, and therefore the region of Yemen will include the countries that 
surround it. These candidate countries, in his view, share several common features among them that 
provide some of the ingredients of empowerment -- geographical depth, terrain that allows for the 
establishment of zones that can be administered under the management of savagery system, 
weakness of the ruling regime in controlling border areas of its state and even densely populated 
areas, and the existence of an Islamic Jihadist tendency in these areas. If we take Nigeria for 
example and if we want to test the validity of this nomination, we find that it is a real and effective 
candidate based on the activities of the Boko Haram group that declared allegiance to ISIS. 
 
In short, the objectives of the strike and exhaust stage is based on two main pillars: First, the 
exhaustion of the ‘enemy’ forces and scattering their efforts through the execution of small-scale 
and impact operations, and to repeat these types of operations to have a long-term impact with a 
focus on Muslim communities around the world to undertake striking operations that would serve to 
distract the ability of ‘the enemy’.  Second, building the foundations for the Jihadi waves coming 
from outside the border and attract the youth in order to undertake quality Jihadi operations. So as 
the picture becomes even clearer with regards to the strike and exhaust step, we may note here the 
acts of terrorism that took place in many European capitals such as in Paris and the Charlie Hebdo 
magazine incident
5
, Copenhagen
6
,and the recent cartoon art gallery incident in Texas
7  
in the US. 
Also noteworthy is the number of Jihadis coming from Europe to join the ranks of ISIS
8
.  
 
  Renewed conflict hotspots 
After having given a full detailed explanation of the methodology used by the terrorist 
groups that are moving as we have mentioned according the management of savagery methodology, 
and comparing the most important steps of this methodology with real life examples experienced in 
armed conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq, we must take a look at the tragedies suffered by these 
countries as a result of the factors of conflict on the one hand,  and as a result of the control 
exercised by these terrorist organizations on the other. The number of Syrian refugees alone is 
enough to prove the gravity of the catastrophic situation that has arisen from killings, displacement, 
torture, exploitation and sectarian fighting. The same applies to Iraq.  Since the invasion of Iraq by 
US forces in April 2003, local and international organizations have registered a rise in the number 
of orphans and widows because of the aggravated security situation in the country, and which has 
seen no stability throughout the last 10 years. This has started to reflect on society. 
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According to Unicef, 2014 has been one of the most devastating year for children. As many 
as 15 million children are caught up in violent conflicts in the Central African Republic, Iraq, South 
Sudan, the State of Palestine, Syria and Ukraine – including those internally displaced or living as 
refugees.(Press centre | UNICEF 2014). The situation of more than 5.6 million children inside Syria 
remains the most desperate, according to the latest Unicef report. Of these, up to 2 million children 
are living in areas of the country largely cut off from humanitarian aid. Some 2.6 million Syrian 
children are still out of school. Almost 2 million Syrian children are living as refugees in Lebanon, 
Turkey, Jordan and other countries. This is in addition to the 3.6 million children from vulnerable 
communities hosting refugees, who themselves are suffering due to the strain on services like 
education and health. Meanwhile, the crisis gripping Iraq has forced more than 2.8 million children 
from their homes, and left many trapped in areas controlled by armed groups (UNICEF | Press 
centre 2015).   
 
These horrifying facts lead us to think of ways in which we can prevent the radicalization of 
these orphans and their integration within the terrorist groups that use the tragedy that befell their 
families to push them on the frontlines against the whole world. They are told how the international 
community stood as spectators while their country was being destroyed by US forces over a period 
of 10 years. This point alone is capable of mobilizing the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi youth who 
are psychologically devastated, physically exhausted and emotionally deprived towards an act of 
revenge in order to retrieve their rights from an international community which has caused 
according to that which has been implanted in their minds by the advocates of murder and terrorism 
the loss of their future and the future of their nation, religion and Islamic Caliphate, not to mention 
the financial support offered by these groups to those involved in its ranks who come from a state of 
extreme poverty and neglect. 
 
This catastrophe is being repeated again today. We are witnessing a Syrian tragedy in the 
true sense of the word. Hundreds of thousands of orphans, millions of displaced people, thousands 
of young Syrians have lost the opportunity for education and living in peace and have joined the 
ranks of groups that mould them according to their sectarian, religious and ethnic whims. These 
groups have fed the spirit of revenge, murder and criminality to these youths, followed by the 
fatwas of extremist scholars who have made these young people the cannon fodder for their 
sectarian war against other groups. Because of these scattered conflicts, the youth have been 
deprived of the ideas of justice, tolerance, understanding and love of the other, and these have been 
replaced with the logic of murder and crime in the shadow of countries that follow the law of the 
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jungle, where the strong prevails over the weak. How can we speak of the existence of a state where 
this terrorism is being combated while we are still suffering its effects everywhere in the world and 
we can clearly see the factors affecting the formation, composition and consolidation of this 
terrorism? State failure and fragility is the primary source of terrorism, extremism and violence of 
all kinds. 
 
Failed or fragile states and the disastrous results arising from cross-border terrorism and 
violence has prompted millions of people to migrate in order to search for better living 
opportunities that guarantee them security, peace and dignity. The terrorism emanating from failed 
or fragile states has severely diminished the chance for a decent social life and this is reflected in 
poor health, educational, social and even psychological conditions in these societies. These factors 
have contributed to the emergence of a generation of young drifters searching for an identity that 
distinguishes them in the middle of the chaos prevailing in their countries. In Somalia and Iraq, 70% 
of the population is under the age of 30, while the percentage of this age group is more than 53% in 
Nigeria and 48% in Mali (Gaub 2015). The majority of these youth suffer from the aforementioned 
social conditions. This brings us to an important topic which requires in-depth study to help us 
understand the bigger picture about one of the ramifications of terrorism and violence that occurs as 
a result of these conflicts, and this is the psychological factor and its role in creating a state of 
intellectual dispersion among generations of Muslim youth in particular. How do these conflicts 
affect the mental state of these people and how does it work on the formation of being a source of 
justification for all types of violent behavior? 
 
Failure of state machinery and the sectarian and social divide has given the Islamic State the 
perfect staging post for their savagery to be unleashed and showcased through clever use of social 
media. The brutality is designed to frighten military and other opposition forces as well as the 
public, and to wean away jihadi fighters from other groups. In fact, under Al Zarqawi’s leadership, 
the Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) had also pursued the same strategy, which was opposed by Al Qaeda 
and led to the breakup of their relationship. Al Zarqawi’s goal too, before the Islamic State came 
into existence, was the establishment of a caliphate. In the management of savagery during the 
transition to caliphate, the limited strategy entails securing the territory seized and controlling its 
frontiers. The second stage is to aim for financial security, which the Islamic State has achieved by 
taking control of oilfields, arms and industrial infrastructure. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, as an inevitable result of the presence of conflicts and the 
low level of basic services in fragile states, many Muslim families have migrated from their 
countries to Europe in search of security, peace and a better life. These families have migrated with 
their entire legacy of sectarian warfare, and the mental, social, political and economic effects 
thereof. It is very natural that out of these families there would be individuals who hold extremist 
ideas and the circumstances of marginalization and conflict have contributed to the formation of 
their extremist ideas charged with sectarian hatred resulting from years of war. Herein lies the point 
of confrontation between this heavy legacy of excessive negativity that came out of these 
communities, and between the openness, democracy and peace found in Europe. This combination 
is neither intellectually, mentally, psychologically, or above all, religiously homogenized. Some 
members of these communities do not find that their presence in these countries necessarily entails 
the need for integration into the prevailing societal values, because simply put, they do not believe 
that it has anything to do with the teachings of Islam. In other words, the roots of tension between 
the Muslim and European communities were clear from the beginning. From here, we must argue 
the need to talk about projects that enhance the process of integration, which have been dealt with 
by many researchers in which they discussed many of the aspects that have been reviewed in the 
previous chapter of this thesis. 
 
All findings of the previous studies and research on the issue of the integration of Muslim 
communities within Western societies, whether true or false, remain attempts to understand this 
decades-long tense relationship, and I am not going to dedicate this thesis to having a Byzantine 
debate over their correctness or the correctness of the examples they contain. This dialogue 
consumed us for many years, and is renewed every time with the same formula when there is  
renewed terrorism and there is an advent of new terrorist groups practising cross-border terrorist 
activities, whether in Europe or the countries of the Islamic world. 
 
I have said through this thesis that it is inevitable that conflict zones lead to the emergence 
of extremist and violent groups. But, if we want to test this point specifically as being the cause of 
violence in Europe, it will certainly fail, as there is no conflict zones and wars and instances of 
security, political and military vacuums, so how do we view the cause of this extremism being 
located there? Here, the role of politicized religious discourse, and a compliance rooted in holy 
ignorance and insecurity, generally entrenched among Muslim communities in Europe, comes to the 
fore. Why Europe?  Because these communities are in a state of psychological and intellectual 
conflict between religious inheritance and a cultural state of isolation and introversion that comes 
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with migration, and between the cultural, social and religious reality in Europe where freedom of 
belief and openness are thus faced with two choices. First option to abandon all these traditions and 
embrace the new society to which you have moved to, and this collides with one’s continuous 
religious discourse, which regards the adoption of any new values of these communities as being 
tantamount to reneging on the religious foundations of Islam thus entering the circle of disbelief. 
The second option is a life of separation and isolation from the new society in which you live in fear 
of not falling within the circle of disbelief. Therefore, the dilemma of integration or no integration is 
flourishing again. 
 
This thesis is an open invitation for frank self-criticism from Muslim communities by 
introducing a set of clear and explicit questions: Do we really want to create a state of intellectual 
and moral integration and convergence with the communities in which we live? How long will we 
continue to be consumed by for wars and sectarian differences and schools of thought within 
Islamic law? When will we follow reason and logic in dealing with matters that have to do with 
Islam and in facing criticism laid against us, free from emotional reaction? Are we really interested 
in coexistence and harmony within European societies or are what concerns us only the social and 
economic services provided by these countries’ welfare systems? Until when will our minds remain 
hostage to the sanctification of religious ignorance and superstition practiced by a group of 
preachers across TV channels and social media? Do we respect the rule of law due to our faith in it 
or due to our fear of law? Finally, is it possible to admit to mistakes exercised by some of our own 
people while representing Islamic law? 
 
On the other hand, isn’t there a middle way? Is integration only dependent on Muslims? 
There certainly needs to be a cooling down of rhetoric from the political leadership as well as media 
directed against the ‘other’ and move the debate away from security and civilizational ‘end of 
history’ theories towards a political and societal level that is more accommodating the concerns of 
the minorities and reflective of the current European inter-cultural space that offers hope and 
breakthroughs at various levels in the immediate future. The situation calls for a cooling down of 
rhetoric now predominantly ranged against the ‘other’ that seems to triggers minority anxiety in 
Europe. 
 
I believe that the answer to these questions will form the keys to recognizing certain flaws 
and weaknesses, which will certainly strengthen the desire for integration, co-existence and 
harmony among Muslim communities in Europe. It will go a long way to control the exploitation of 
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Muslim communities in Europe by terror groups to carry out the first step of empowerment of 
which I have mentioned previously s and which is to strike and exhaust. 
 
 
 
 
IX. Conclusion 
If we posit the issue of conflict and violence found in fragile states as fertile ground for the 
growth of terrorist groups, we continue to have important indicators which links to the issue of 
integration with Western societies, especially if we look at the level of basic services provided in 
these fragile states and which range from a severe lack of developed educational systems, tlow level 
of health care, and lack of infrastructure services. These are reasons driving many Muslim and non-
Muslim communities to migrate to developed countries; so the fragility of these countries have yet 
another dimension which is unrelated to the outcome of wars, disasters and conflicts. If we restrict 
ourselves to the topic of the fallout from these indicators only, the issue of the integration of 
immigrants in the European community becomes paramount due to the wide gaps between the 
religions, cultural beliefs and societal behaviours. 
 
What the Arab and Muslim people are going through today is very necessary, and it is an 
opportunity given to us by History towards mutual recognition as Muslim and Western societies. 
Recognition that the inaction and conflicts of interest between actors on the international arena are 
impediments in finding effective solutions to eliminate conflict and violence and provide the raison 
d’etre that grants these extremist organizations with the ingredients that they have been waiting for 
a long time to re-produce. On a secondary level, we must recognize that the younger generations 
who have no prospects for the future, avenues for education, nor societal recognition based on 
mutual respect and harmony, will remain the cannon fodder for these extremist groups, and they 
will continue to explore a variety of ways to implement their ambitions. What is happening today is 
very important so that the Muslim communities’ centuries-old holy ignorance that enforced upon us 
by many preachers and scholars in the name of Islam is not perpetuated. It is an ignorance based on 
reverence for explanations from some scholars, more than for the religion itself. An ignorance 
rejects all intellectual and cultural diversity, science, philosophy, art, research and thinking. We 
must find solutions to the problems of this era without courtyard solutions, live our lives according 
to the foundations of halal or haram and without dependence on the greed of some of the clergy. 
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In contrast, the mistakes made by some members of European communities in generalisation 
and holding all members of Muslim communities primarily responsible for the death and violence 
by some terrorist groups, serve as a fertile environment for preachers and extremist scholars to 
exploit these accusations by promoting the idea that Western societies hate Muslims, and that 
Muslims are superior in their faith and belief than the rest of the communities. This state of 
exploitation has reached the level of describing the social justice and decent life offered by Europe 
to their communities as non-permanent niceties, and that eternity, and bliss is in paradise. 
  
This is in short what the advocates of radical religious extremism depend on when brainwashing 
the young minds among Muslim immigrants in Europe. As a result, these young people grow up in 
a state of religious mania associated with death or martyrdom related to hastening one’s own death 
in order to obtain eternal paradise. They also exploit the emotional and psychological instincts as 
well as religious sentiment by citing shortcuts towards this by mentioning the virgins of paradise 
and other promises. 
 
We are facing a decisive moment in the rejection of the atrocities committed by these terrorist 
groups by really uniting in accordance with real human values far from the religious extremist 
ideologies, and ethnic and sectarian tendencies. We are facing a historic opportunity to break with 
the past filled with hatred, ignorance and the classification of people according to religious and 
sectarian beliefs. 
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